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In the November 1995 issue of this journal (62:4), I published an
early draft of a moral theological treatment of a question then
formulated: "How far may Catholic hospitals cooperate with nonCatholic providers?" I invited readers to send criticisms and
suggestions for improvement. Taking into account the many
thoughtful comments I received, I greatly revised that draft before
publishing (In The Way of the Lord Jesus, Vol. Ill, Difficult Moral
Questions, Quincy, IL: Quincy University, 1997, pp 391-402.) the
treatment of that question - along with forty-nine others on various
health care issues and one hundred and fifty more on other matters. *
Meanwhile, however, several publications on the same or
closely related topics have included criticisms of some statements in
the tentative draft. Most of those criticisms have been based on
misinterpretations of my views. In part, the misinterpretations were
due to critics' overlooking vital parts of my argument in their efforts
to show the moral acceptability of certain sorts of cooperation I
regard as immoral. But in part, the trouble was due to various
defects in that early draft.
So, I doubt it would be helpful to respond in detail to
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published criticism of that draft. Rather, since the issues are very
important and probably will remain so for many years, I think it will
be more helpful simply to replace the early draft with the following
revised, final version.

How far may Catholic hospitals cooperate with providers of
immoral services?
Statement of the Question:
As you may know, the religious institute of women to which I
belong always has been committed to health care. We regard it as an
apostolate that continues in our day an essential part of Jesus' own
ministry during his earthly life. At present, our various provinces
operate hospitals in many communities and several states.
In times past, we carried on our work autonomously, ignoring
most other health care providers while allowing some non-Catholics
to work in our hospitals under conditions we set. Today, however,
mutually agreeable cooperative relationships with those who do not
share our faith and ethical views are becoming increasingly vital.
There are four reasons: the increasing complexity of health care,
which requires many forms of cooperation to meet the needs of the
people we serve; the need to eliminate duplication in order to limit
escalating costs; the demands of payers (the government and
insurance companies) that we meet their conditions with respect to
benefits and adapt to their arrangements for financing them; and the
resistance of non-Catholics (and also of Catholics who do not agree
with some of the Church's teachings) to the U.S. bishops' Ethical and
Religious Directives. Given the trends of the time, our hospitals
either will participate in various sorts of cooperative relationships or
will become increasingly marginalized and ultimately financially
nonviable.
Recognizing this dilemma, our superiors have established an
interprovincial committee, of which I am a member, to develop
guidelines for various types of cooperative arrangements. While
difficult to sort out and classify, these appear to fall into four broad
groups, though with some overlap: (1) simple contractual
arrangements with other hospitals, diagnostic facilities, individual
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physicians, and so forth; (2) integrated delivery networks, that is,
broad affiliations with other institutions and providers to deliver the
complete spectrum of health care in a particular locality; (3)
cosponsored health maintenance organizations or similar deliverers
of health care to certain groups of insured people; and (4)
arrangements assuming responsibility for a purchased portion of the
practices of a group of physicians and/or other providers who, at the
same time, will remain free to offer the same or other clientele
services in which we feel we cannot participate.
The recently revised Ethical and Religious Directives and the
committee's initial discussions seem to indicate that, where the
ethical aspects are concerned, two matters will be central.
First, while our commitment to the health care apostolate
requires that we do whatever is necessary under rapidly changing
conditions to continue delivering quality services, we must find ways
to maintain our institutions' Catholic identity even as we surrender
some of our traditional autonomy and legal control.
Second, though we will not sponsor any forbidden procedures
(such as sterilizations and abortions) in our own hospitals, we
necessarily will cooperate with those who perform them; therefore,
we must clarify the ways in which formal cooperation might arise in
the delivery of services under various arrangements, and try to limit
our hospitals' involvement to material cooperation.
Though I know you probably will not be able to say much on
the basis of such a general description of the problems we face, I will
be grateful for any suggestions you can offer regarding their ethical
aspects.
Analysis:

The questioner seeks fuller answers to two closely related
questions touched on briefly in the 1994 revision of the Ethical and
Religious Directives. The first question concerns the Catholic
identity of Catholic hospitals, and calls for a clarification of the
concept of the health care apostolate and the likely impact on it of
entering into and carrying on the sorts of arrangements described.
The second question concerns formal and material cooperation. An
adequate response must explain two things. (1) Formal cooperation
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can occur not only in carrying on a cooperative arrangement but also,
and even especially, in setting it up. (2) Material cooperation also
can be wrong, and a Catholic hospital's material cooperation with the
provision of morally unacceptable services is likely to be wrong.
Catholic hospitals that avoid all wrongful cooperation and maintain
their identity may not be economically viable. Therefore, Catholics
committed to health care as an apostolate may have to look for other,
better ways of carrying it on. I
The reply could be along the following lines:

As you say, I cannot provide specific moral advice in
response to a general question. However, I will sketch out some
considerations that I think the administrators of your hospitals should
keep in mind as they deliberate about entering into any cooperative
arrangement with other providers.
First, because Catholic identity is maintained by living up to
the moral requirements of faith and is obscured, and ultimately
abandoned, by living as nonbelievers do, the questions about
Catholic identity and the moral limits of cooperation are not
separable. Clarifying the concept of the apostolate of health care and
its roots in Jesus' ministry will help answer both questions.
Since death is humankind's last enemy ( see 1 Cor 15:26) and
is part of the punishment for sin ( see OS 15111788), Jesus'
redemptive mission was to overcome not only sin but death by
making available resurrection and everlasting life. As health perfects
life, disease detracts from it and ends in death. Thus, Jesus raised
the dead and cured people of diseases. Yet, though these miracles no
doubt were motivated partly by compassion for the suffering
individuals he helped, Jesus' principal intention in healing people
was to provide signs and foretastes of the coming of God's kingdom.
Had he been committed to providing health care, having the power
to cure everyone and raise all the dead, he would have done so. This
consideration makes it clear that simply delivering quality health
care services, as even some nonbelievers do, does not carry on an
essential part of Jesus' ministry.
In commending the health care service of consecrated
persons, John Paul II clarifies what is required if such work is to be ,a
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genuine apostolate:
The church looks with admiration and gratitude upon the many
consecrated persons who, by caring for the sick and the
suffering, contribute in a significant way to her mission. They
carry on the ministry of mercy of Christ, who "went about doing
good and healing all (who were oppressed by the devil)" (Acts
10:38). In the footsteps of the Divine Samaritan, physician of
souls and bodies, and following the example of their respective
founders and foundresses, those consecrated persons committed
to this ministry by the charism of their Institute should persevere
in their witness of love towards the sick, devoting themselves to
them with profound understanding and compassion. They
should give a special place in their ministry to the poorest and
most abandoned of the sick, such as the elderly, and those who
are terminally ill, and to the victims of drug abuse and the new
contagious diseases. Consecrated persons should encourage the
sick themselves to offer their sufferings in Communion with
Christ, crucified and glorified for the salvation of all. Indeed
they should strengthen in the sick the awareness of being able to
carry out a pastoral ministry of their own through the specific
charism of the Cross, by means of their prayer and their
testimony in word and deed.
Moreover, the Church reminds consecrated men and
women that a part of their mission is to evangelize the health
care centers in which they work, striving to spread the light of
Gospel values to the way of living, suffering and dying of the
people of our day. They should endeavor to make the practice of
medicine more human, and increase their knowledge of bioethics
at the service of the Gospel of life. Above all, therefore, they
should foster respect for the person and for human life from
conception to its natural end, in full conformity with the moral
teaching of the Church. For this purpose, they should set up
centers of formation and cooperate closely with those ecclesial
bodies entrusted with the pastoral ministry of health care. 2

Thus, to be an apostolate that carries on Jesus' ministry of mercy,
Catholic hospitals must not only deliver quality health care but
provide service to "the poorest and most abandoned of the sick", give
religious instruction and encouragement along with health care,
explicitly evangelize, strive to humanize medical practice, fully
conform to the Church's moral teaching, and supply sound formation
in that teaching. Of course, even isolated individuals' work in the
field of health care can qualify as a lay apostolate, in the same way as
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other morally acceptable occupations Christians might undertake, if
carried out in a way that struggles against the evils that amict such
work and restores it in the light of the gospel, manifests Christian
mercy, and bears clear witness to faith (see AA 5-7; Living a
Christian Life, 102-13). However, Catholic hospitals will have lost
their identity unless they meet all the conditions for carrying on
Jesus' mission of mercy. 3
The challenge they face must not be underestimated. A
hospital is not simply a formal, institutional structure; it is a
community whose corporate identity and character depend on the
people who make it up. Thus, a Catholic hospital's special apostolate
requires that the critical mass of participants be not only practicing
Catholics but people whose professional work is permeated by faith
and Christian mercy. However, most religious institutes operating
hospitals have experienced a decline in the new members, and now
can staff only a few positions in their hospitals while filling a few
others with Catholics who have the necessary characteristics. Hence,
even if Catholic hospitals could retain the autonomy they formerly
enjoyed, their ability to carry on their special apostolate, and so their
very Catholic identity, would be in question.
Second, those entering into cooperative arrangements should
not take too narrow a view of the actual and potential problem areas.
These are by no means limited to sterilization and abortion.
Prescribing contraceptives and helping people use them normally
involve formal cooperation with contraception, and even material
cooperation, especially with forms of contraception whose mode of
action sometimes is abortifacient, can be gravely wrong. Genetic
counseling to assist deliberation about contraception, sterilization~
and abortion normally involves formal cooperation in those immoral
activities.
The treatment of sterility often involves formal
In vitro fertilization is morally
cooperation in masturbation.
unacceptable in itself, and procedures such as TOT and GIFT are
questionable. 4 While treatment often can be rightly limited or
withdrawn, either can be a method of suicide or homicide, and both
are likely to be abused by coming attempts to ration care on the basis
of so-called quality of life, with the result that the elderly, the
severely retarded, and others will be unjustly discriminated against
and many of them will be victims of homicide by nontreatment and
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neglect. Active euthanasia also is likely to be legalized, at first by
permitting assisted suicide, but eventually by authorizing euthanasia
for many people, including some incapable of consent, whose lives
others do not consider worth living.
Third, you realize you must "try to limit" your hospitals'
involvement in "forbidden procedures" to material cooperation, and
say: "We will not sponsor any forbidden procedures (such as
sterilizations and abortions) in our own hospitals. " You rightly note
the importance of clarifying "the ways in which formal cooperation
might arise in the delivery of services under various arrangements."
But you also say that "our commitment to the health care apostolate
requires that we do whatever is necessary under rapidly changing
conditions to continue delivering quality services." This way of
putting the matter suggests that you consider continuing to operate
your hospitals as the essential objective and consider avoiding
wrongdoing as an incidental, though important, concern. Firmly
committed to continuing to deliver quality services, you will try to
avoid formal cooperation in sterilization and abortion. 5 However,
doing God's will and entirely avoiding wrongdoing are at the heart of
anything that can be called an apostolate. Do not regard actions such
as sterilization and abortion merely as forbidden procedures and do
not think of wrongful cooperation with them merely as rule breaking,
to be avoided if possible. Recognize such acts as grave injuries to
persons or their very destruction, and thus contrary to Christian love
and entirely incompatible with your apostolate.
Someone might argue that you can easily avoid formal
cooperation if you reluctantly work with non-Catholic providers only
insofar as you must in order to continue operating your hospitals.
Acting under duress, it might be argued, your participation in
necessary cooperative arrangements will not be formal cooperation,
it will be like the submission of a woman threatened with death by a
would-be rapist: in order to save her life, the woman obeys his orders
to undress and assume a certain position. Plainly such a woman
chooses only to do things morally acceptable in themselves for the
good end of saving her life, and she neither intends sexual
intercourse with the rapist as an end nor chooses it as a means. So,
the argument could conclude, your hospitals need neither intend nor
choose any forbidden procedure. They need only choose to take the
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morally acceptable steps they must take to survive.
True, duress can lead one to choose to carry out another's
orders by doing things that, though not wrong in themselves,
ordinarily would be chosen only if one wished to cooperate in a
wrongful common action. But duress also can lead one to choose
reluctantly to adopt an immoral way of life and cooperate in common
actions. The desperate woman who reluctantly chooses to become a
prostitute as a way of earning her living fonnally cooperates in
immoral acts, though with considerably mitigated guilt. Unlike the
rape victim, who chooses to submit passively to violence, and like
the desperate woman who chooses prostitution, your hospitals,
though under duress, may well come to cooperate fonnally in the
immoral activities of other parties to the complex arrangements into
which the hospitals are constrained to enter.
Since sponsoring acts of mutilation and killing in your own
hospitals plainly would be fonnal cooperation with those evils, you
rightly reject doing so. But even without sponsoring immoral
procedures carried out in a hospital, those responsible for the
hospital can fonnally cooperate with such procedures. Indeed, if a
hospital is involved in a cooperative arrangement with providers who
do immoral procedures, its administrators can fonnally cooperate in
those procedures even if they are done elsewhere and without using
any of their hospital's facilities.
Unlike people who manage a hotel, the administrators of a
hospital ordinarily do sponsor the things done in it. Since a hospital
exists to provide health care services, administrators ordinarily
intend each and every procedure carried out using its facilities. Of
course, if a hospital's administrators were blamelessly unaware of
wrong things done in it, they would not cooperate with them, and
they might avoid fonnally cooperating even with certain wrongful
activities done in the hospital they knew about but neither initiated
nor facilitated.
However, administrators hardly can avoid
cooperating fonnally with procedures such as sterilization and
abortion done using their hospital's facilities. They must ensure that
patients, having been adequately infonned, genuinely consent, and
must see to it that the procedures are carried out correctly.
Therefore, when such a procedure is done in a hospital, even if its
administrators not only avoid sponsoring it but are very displeased
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about its being done, they are likely to cooperate fonnally in it.
Fonnal cooperation also can occur without a hospital's
facilities being used when the hospital is involved in a cooperative
arrangement with providers of sterilization, abortion, and other evils.
Suppose that the arrangement to provide the complete spectrum of
health care in a locality or all services for participants in a health
maintenance organization includes some immoral activity of at least
one of the other providers involved in this joint enterprise. In that
case, all who share responsibility for managing the enterprise will
fonnally cooperate in that activity insofar as they must ensure that
patients give infonned consent and that those directly involved meet
professional standards.
Therefore, if your hospitals enter an
arrangement with providers of any evil, they either must avoid all
responsibility for managing the joint enterprise or entirely exclude
from it the evils other parties provide.
Moreover, your hospitals will be involved not just in
delivering services after an arrangement has been made but in
making the arrangement. 6 Moral nonns can be violated at this stage.
Suppose, for instance, a governmental agency, insurer, or
non-Catholic health care provider sought to create an entity to
provide the full range of services that at least some of the prospective
clientele and parties to the cooperative arrangement think pertain to
health care. Suppose a Catholic hospital was a potential party to the
prospective arrangement. The negotiators might agree that nothing
contrary to the Ethical and Religious Directives would be done in the
Catholic hospital or sponsored by it; they might even arrange that
providers working in the Catholic hospital would never be called on
to refer for excluded services or follow up on them. To ensure that
the Catholic hospital would be able to avoid such unacceptable
cooperation, they also would agree that one of the other parties to the
arrangement would provide the excluded services for clients who
wanted them. This arrangement seemingly would neatly divide
responsibility, isolating the Catholic hospital from immoral
activities.
In making the arrangement, however, the Catholic
negotiators, intending to avoid providing the immoral services in
their hospital, would have intended that another party supply them.
So, making the arrangement would be fonnal cooperation in the
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other party's supplying them. Moreover, when those authorized to
act on behalf of the Catholic hospital signed the contract, the hospital
would be agreeing to all its provisions and intending its doing so to
motivate the other parties to agree to the contract and do as they
agreed. So, since one of the other contracting parties would have
undertaken to provide immoral services, the hospital would be
formally cooperating in that undertaking and its execution as long as
the contract remained in force.
Someone might object that nothing the Catholic hospital did
would bring about anything immoral. The governmental agency,
insurer, or non-Catholic health care provider initiating negotiations
might well have decided beforehand that certain services, such as
sterilization, would be provided, "either because the market
'necessitates' this or because the government will mandate a basic
benefits package which will require provision of all services." And,
indeed, the immoral services would be provided even if the Catholic
hospital did not participate - the arrangement "designed this way will
neither increase nor decrease the number of prohibited procedures."
Moreover, the objection will continue: "The 'moral object' of the
Catholic provider is the provision of health care as a Gospel
mission." So: "The moral object of creating [the entity] is precisely
not to provide prohibited procedures." Therefore, the objection will
conclude: "Since our intention is not to provide services we deem
immoral, cooperation seems to be material. ,, 7
The problem with this argument is that it treats the Catholic
hospital's intended end - providing health care as an apostolate
without being involved in immoral procedures - as the moral object
of its choice to participate in the arrangement. But the object of that
choice precisely is to make an arrangement for "provision of all
services", and in choosing to make this arrangement, each
contracting party intends the others to make and carry out the
undertakings required of them by the arrangement. Therefore, to
achieve its good end the Catholic hospital chooses a bad means: to
have the immoral procedures provided by another party to the
arrangement. Even if no more immoral procedures are done than
would have been done in the absence of the arrangement, the
Catholic hospital will have intended to arrange that the immoral
procedures be done as a necessary means to "the provision of health
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care as a Gospel mission."
But, it might be argued, this formal cooperation could be
avoided. Your hospitals could refuse to agree to anything more than
this: "We are only going to do together what all partners agree is
appropriate and anything deemed inappropriate must be the private
project of that proponent. ,,8 Thus, the contract would omit all
reference to immoral activities except to make it clear that the
Catholic provider would not provide them and that the cooperative
arrangement in no way concerned them. The Catholic negotiators
could require that the contract not specify that any party to it would
provide any immoral service. They could even require that the
contract's effectiveness not be contingent on any agreement between
the other parties for the provision of any immoral service.
One can imagine making agreements with provisions of that
sort, and such agreements could be made and carried out without
formally cooperating in another party's immoral procedures. But an
agreement with such provisions hardly would satisfy those who
"mandate a basic benefits package which will require provision of all
services."
To satisfy them, negotiators might work out an
arrangement to provide all services but agree to fonnalize it in two or
more legal documents so that the Catholic party would not be
required to sign any contract that made reference to immoral
procedures except in specifying that the Catholic party would not
provide them. However, if the set of documents gave effect to the
whole arrangement, the choices of all parties in signing any of them
would depend on one another's undertakings in the same way as they
would if a single contract straightforwardly implemented the
agreement to provide all services, and the Catholic hospital would
fonnally cooperate in providing all of them.
In sum, entirely avoiding formal cooperation in immoral
practices will be difficult indeed. It can arise in ways that are not
obvious and it seems unavoidable in any arrangement that would
satisfy a mandate to provide all services. Though I have pointed out
some of the problems, there might well be others.
Fourth, avoiding fonnal cooperation in wrongdoing is not
enough. Even if it can be avoided, your hospitals will materially
cooperate with all the services by other providers in any way
facilitated by a cooperative arrangement. Such material cooperation
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can be morally unacceptable for several reasons. It can occasion a
sin of formal cooperation; it can be scandalous; materially
cooperating with wrongdoing can impair the capacity to give
credible witness against it; and it can be unfair to those injured by the
wrongdoing.
In providing health care, one who materially cooperates in
wrongdoing often will be tempted to cooperate formally for three
closely related reasons. Health care providers ordinarily share the
intentions of those they serve; particular services ordinarily must be
integrated into a comprehensive pattern of care; and the problem
with morally excluded services very often is that a bad means is
chosen to attain an appropriate end. For example, if a woman's or
family's physical and/or psychological health calls for birth
regulation and the woman refuses morally acceptable means, any
health care provider sharing responsibility for her care will be
tempted not only to refer her to someone who will prescribe other
means but to try to ensure that she uses her chosen means regularly
and effectively. Even if a Catholic hospital's policy excludes such
formal cooperation, members of its staff and some other personnel some and perhaps many of whom do not accept the truth the Church
teaches on such matters - almost certainly will be drawn into it.
If a Catholic hospital is to carry on its work as an apostolate,
its board members and administrators should deal with formal
cooperation in various evils by its personnel. If those responsible
instead studiously avoid noticing such formal cooperation or decide
to tolerate it, they at least materially cooperate in it in a way that
hardly can be justified. As a community committed to an apostolate,
the hospital will have betrayed itself even if its board members and
administrators manage to stop just short of letting its own complicity
in evil become formal cooperation.
Material cooperation with wrongdoing can be scandalous in
the strict sense: It can lead people to sin by encouraging them in
rationalization and self-deception (which do not free them of guilt)
regarding the wrongdoing. The scandal would not be prevented by a
Catholic institution's prohibition of morally unacceptable procedures
within the domain remaining to it, even if that policy is well
publicized. For, to most non-Catholics and many Catholics that
material cooperation would seem to imply that those procedures are
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not wrong in themselves but merely forbidden to Catholics, as eating
meat on Friday used to be. Moreover, other things being equal, a
Catholic institution's material cooperation is much more likely to be
scandalous than an individual Catholic's. The institution's acts are
presumed to be fully deliberate and free, not the product of ignorance
or weakness, as an individual's might be. And since the institution
claims to be distinguished from others by being Catholic, wnatever it
does is taken by many non-Catholics and even, unsophisticated
Catholics to be the Church's own act.
In various ways, a Catholic institution's significant, obvious,
voluntary cooperation in wrongdoing inevitably will impair and
probably even negate its capacity to provide credible witness. For
example, commingled with the service of secularized providers, its
activities will become less identifiable and less distinctively
Catholic. Again, the closer association with health care providers
whose practice violates moral nonns taught by the Church often will
make it harder for a Catholic institution's administrators and staff to
speak out for the truth of those nonns and work against their
violation. Its partnership in an integrated delivery network or
cosponsorship of an HMO providing sterilization, abortion, or
euthanasia will strongly suggest that the Catholic Church does not
really and finnly reject these evils but only maintains an insincere
official opposition. For those engaged in health care as an apostolate
to impair their witness in these and other ways would be utterly selfdefeating, since, to repeat, the essence of apostolate is not only to
promote a human good such as health but to practice Christian love
and bear witness to the gospels' truth, including love for the tiniest
and the most debilitated of Jesus' sisters and brothers, and the moral
truths regarding how they are to be dealt with.
The material cooperation itself, together with the scandal and
impainnent of witness, will have consequences. Some individuals
will die or suffer lesser injuries that might have been prevented if
those who profess the sacredness of life and the dignity of persons
consistently avoided complicity in wrongful behavior. Accepting
these bad consequences is likely to be unfair unless the victims
themselves freely consent to what they suffer. Like individuals,
institutions should be prepared to make great sacrifices rather than
allow anything they do to bring about the death of - or grave injury
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to - an innocent person.
Someone might argue that many health care providers who
do not accept Catholic moral teaching are convinced that what they
are doing is right, and if those with whom a Catholic hospital
cooperates act out of sincere consciences, their good faith calls for
respect that can justify otherwise excluded material cooperation. But
Catholic hospital administrators are responsible for their own acts.
The apparent sincerity of conscience of others - their actual
consciences are unavailable to us - does call for respect and
sometimes justifies toleration of objective wrongdoing. But their
apparent good faith may even increase the temptation to cooperate
formally with them by making such cooperation seem less
repugnant. And if some who appear to be acting in good faith
actually are rationalizing and deceiving themselves, cooperating with
them can give very serious scandal by making it more difficult for
them to acknowledge the truth and repent. Similarly, cooperating
with others presumed to be in good faith makes it not easier but in
some ways more difficult to bear clear witness to the truth about
what they are doing. And even real good faith cannot reduce the
unfairness to third parties involved in helping bring about effects
injurious or destructive to them.
In view of these considerations, it seems to me that limited
material cooperation with non-Catholic providers is least likely to be
morally excluded from the first and fourth of the types of cooperative
arrangements you mention: specific forms of cooperation with other
providers, and purchasing and administering the morally acceptable
services of other providers. As for the second and third types of
cooperative arrangements, even if a Catholic hospital can participate
in an integrated delivery network or cooperatively operated health
maintenance organization with others who provide immoral
procedures while avoiding formal cooperation in them, I doubt that it
can justifiably engage in the material cooperation that any such
arrangement would require of it. Moreover, operating within the
cooperative arrangement, the Catholic hospital's distinctive
characteristics and practices would be likely to be marginalized or
even completely suppressed, so that even if it maintained its juridical
ties with the Church, it will no longer carry on Jesus' ministry of
mercy and will have lost its Catholic identity.
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Fifth, the preceding considerations make it clear that you
cannot assume that you always will be able to enter into the
arrangements necessary to keep a hospital financially viable while
entirely avoiding wrongful cooperation. Therefore, you ought to be
prepared to give up at least some - and eventually, perhaps all - of
your hospitals.
In bearing witness, individual Christians are
expected to sacrifice even life itself when that is necessary. Should
not your institute be ready to bear witness by giving up its hospitals
and finding other ways of carrying on its apostolate under today's
changing conditions?
Many dedicated and generous women and men put their
money and effort into building the system of Catholic hospitals
founded and operated by your institute and others. Health care fully
integrated with Catholic faith, moral teaching, and pastoral care
would otherwise have been unavailable; some cities and towns
would have lacked hospitals; and many poor people would have been
deprived of hospital care. Without Catholic teaching hospitals,
Catholics would not have had the opportunity to be trained as
physicians and nurses in full harmony with their faith and in a way
that helped many of them carry on their professional work as a true
apostolate.
Since Catholic hospital administrators today are, as it were,
trustees for those who built the system, your superiors rightly wish to
adapt to the changed situation and carry on the apostolate, if
possible. But they would betray their trust in saving their hospitals
by changing them in ways their founders and supporters would not
approve. Institutions, like hospitals, are only means for carrying out
a health care apostolate. Like other means, their usefulness is
limited. Remaining attached to them as their usefulness diminishes
will entail infidelity to the good they formerly served.
Many of the benefits that flowed in the past from operating
Catholic hospitals will no longer be realized if they are merged into
the secularized health care system, and some of those benefits could
be realized even without Catholic hospitals. To provide health care
fully integrated with Catholic faith, moral teaching, and pastoral care
surely is a noble ideal. But how likely is it to be realized by a
Catholic hospital whose services are merged into an integrated
delivery network or HMO cosponsored by secularized providers?
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Catholic teaching hospitals offer a valuable opportunity for Catholics
to be trained in full accord with their faith only if their programs are
consistently Catholic, and if nurses and doctors completing those
programs will be able to practice without moral compromise in the
fields for which they trained. But where such principled practice
remains possible, the technical training for it is likely to be available
outside Catholic teaching hospitals, and individuals can acquire their
indispensable moral and spiritual formation by private study and
from faithful Catholic mentors whose concerns extend to health care.
Finally, just as individuals maintain their Christian identity
by constantly seeking, accepting, and faithfully fulfilling their
personal vocations, so groups of Christians who make up
associations maintain their identity as Christian communities only by
fidelity to their proper missions. Fidelity precludes questioning basic
commitments, such as the vows by which you and other members of
your institute have consecrated your lives. But it also calls for
periodic reconsideration of all projects undertaken to implement
those basic commitments. Like discernment pertaining to vocation,
this reconsideration should seek to match gifts and resources with
the opportunities to serve others by meeting their genuine needs, not
only for temporal goods but for spiritual ones. In carrying on such
reconsideration, members of your institute might ask: What health
care needs are now unmet and likely to remain unmet by others?
And what gifts equip us for meeting some of those needs?
Today, I believe, clearheaded and courageous reflection may
well point toward refusing to accept a subordinate role for your
hospitals in a secularized health care system and instead adopting
more suitable means of serving people most in need and least served
by the secularized system. Candidates for your service include the
terminally ill who need appropriate care to die with true dignity
rather than by the indignity of suicide or homicide,9 handicapped
individuals whose quality of life falls below some arbitrarily set
limit, unborn babies whose abortions the system would provide and
whose mothers need help to choose an alternative, couples who need
instruction in natural family planning, the working poor who lack
health insurance, people too disorganized to make use of the health
care system, the mentally ill who have been "freed" from institutions
to wander in the streets, and other victims of selfishness and
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ideological fashions.
By serving these "poorest and most
abandoned" and joining explicit catechesis and evangelization to that
service, your institute could in truth continue to carry on Jesus'
ministry of mercy.

*

In The Way of the Lord Jesus, volume three, Difficult Moral
Questions (Quincy, IL: Qunicy University, 1997) 391-402.
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